



NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION & DEVELOPMENT CENTER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES

No More Border Walls!

**Critical Analysis of the Costs and Impacts of
U.S. Immigration Enforcement Policy Since IRCA**

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Critical Analysis the Costs and Impacts of U.S. Immigration Enforcement Policy Since IRCA¹

Over the last decades, the enforcement component of Comprehensive Immigration Reform has consistently been regarded as a necessity to reform in spite of declining migration flows and escalating costs. A repeated misconception by Donald Trump and other candidates in the 2016 presidential campaign has been the belief that there is an enforcement deficit along the US Mexican border, and that America has somehow lost control of its borders with massive influx of immigrants². However, the reality is that expenditures along the US-Mexican border are out-of-control. Rather than having a deficit, enforcement expenditures have boomed in the last three decades³.

Since the passage of the last "Comprehensive" Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, expenditures on what are today Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies have increased from an initial \$574 million a year to now over \$18.4 billion in 2015⁴ with a cumulative total of more than a quarter of a trillion dollars including the budget of 2016. The growth in the amounts dedicated to enforcement has been regularly fed by a series of enacted bills to increase enforcement expenditures since 1986 (see figure 1)⁵.

¹ This research report was produced by the UCLA NAID Center at the request of the William C. Velasquez Institute. Marcelo Plietetz and Maksim Wynn provided valuable research assistance to this report.

² Hinojosa, Raul. "Six HUGE Numbers Which Should Automatically Disqualify Trump from Being President". September 2015. Accessed August 2016


http://www.aid.ucla.edu/uploads/4/2/1/9/4219226/hinojosa_six_trump_numbers_final2.pdf

³ US Department of Justice (DOJ), Justice Management Division. (2002). *Budget Trend Data: From 1975 Through the President's 2003 Request to the Congress*. Washington, DC: DOJ. p. 106.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ For details of each enacted bill, see the table attached in appendix


Figure 1 (For a summary of bills passed see appendix)



Most of this rapid enforcement expenditure growth occurred under the George W. Bush administration, where expenditures grew from 4.2 billion in 2000 to 16.3 billion 2008. This growth however, coincided, with the precipitous decline in unauthorized crossings and apprehensions of undocumented immigrants⁶ (see figure 2).

⁶ Ibid.

Figure 2



The increasing expenditure and decreasing apprehensions are resulting in an absurd consequence; whereas in 1992 it took approximately \$1,100 per apprehension, we are now spending close to \$45,000 per apprehension⁷ (See Figure 3). Throughout the same time, the number of border patrol agents grew from 4,100 in 1992 to over 20,000 agents in 2015, plus more than 5,000 Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) agents (See Figure 4)⁸.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP). (2014). *US Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year FY 1992-FY 2013*. Washington, DC: DHS, CBP.
<http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Staffing%20Statistics%201992-2013.pdf>

US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS). (2014). *Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013*. Washington, DC: DHS, OIS.

Figure 3






Figure 4



It is also important to point out that contrary to the popular belief that Obama is quote “The Deporter in Chief”, the total number of apprehensions have continued to plummet since 2009⁹. What, in fact, has changed is that apprehension that previously resulted in “voluntary departure returns,” have more recently resulted in a process of detention, appearance before immigration judges, and formal deportations. It is also important to note that since 2013, the total number of deportations has also significantly declined, along with the continuing steep decline of apprehensions¹⁰.

Figure 5




As previously calculated by the UCLA NAID Center in 2009 and then corroborated by the Congressional Budget Office in 2013, the projections of future immigration is expected to

⁹ US Department of Justice (DOJ), Justice Management Division. (2002). *Budget Trend Data: From 1975 Through the President's 2003 Request to the Congress*. Washington, DC: DOJ. p. 106.

¹⁰ Ibid.

continue its decline. Due to a variety of factors beginning with the slowing demographic growth in México. In addition, it is estimated that legalization would significantly reduce the number of undocumented crossings as occurred after 1986. Lastly, it is estimated that the U.S. economy will experience moderate employment growth and moderate unemployment which will require less number of immigrant workers from México (See Figure 6).


Figure 6



Given the lack of evidence to indicate that the effectiveness of immigration control relies on enforcement measures, we explored other factors of possible association to immigration. One of the strongest the relationship we found was that between unemployment rate in the United States and net undocumented migration. The importance of the US demand... As the slide shows (See Figure 7), there is a strong correlation between the unemployment rate and the annual net change of migration, which indicates that a better focus

for immigration policy should be changing labor supply and demand relations between México and the United States.¹¹

Figure 7




It is important to note that there is a similar counter cyclical correlation between the unemployment rate and the annual changes in the apprehensions of Central American accompanied and unaccompanied juveniles, despite attempts to intercept the flow of migrants to the U.S. border though increase apprehensions within Mexico ,¹²

¹¹ Hinojosa, Raul, "5 Basic Lessons from the "Crisis" of Central American Migrants: Poverty and Violence are Root Causes, but US Labor Demand Remains the Key Driver". September 2014. Retrieved August 2016.

¹² Hinojosa, Raul. "5 Basic Lessons from the "Crisis" of Central American Migrants: Poverty and Violence are Root Causes, but US Labor Demand Remains the Key Driver". September 2014. Retrieved April 2016.

Figure 8 (For detailed data see the appendix)




Source: statistics from Insituto Nacional de Migraciones (INM) of Mexico, Congressional Research Service and CBP FY profiles

Despite these already high enforcement costs, recent congressional attempts at comprehensive immigration reform have continued to call for huge expansions and expenditures as an incentive to anti-immigrant republicans to join the reform effort. For example, the last two CRI bills: Senate Bill 1348 in 2007 and Senate Bill 744 in 2013, requested huge increases in enforcement expenditures. These bills, which were supported by both senators Clinton and Sanders, call for an additional twenty two billion dollars in expenditures over a ten year period of time with the number of border agents expanding from 18,000 to 40,000 by 2023¹³ (See Figure 9).

¹³ US Department of Justice (DOJ), Justice Management Division. (2002). *Budget Trend Data: From 1975 Through the President's 2003 Request to the Congress*. Washington, DC: DOJ. p. 106.

Figure 9



Data from the Congressional Budget Office, indicates that projected cost per apprehension would increase to \$140,000 per apprehension (See Figure 10), and the number of apprehensions per border patrol agent would plummet even further to 14 apprehensions for the entire year, barely one apprehension per month per agent¹⁴ (See Figure 11).

¹⁴ Ibid.

Figure 10





Figure 11



In comparison, the total cost of Trump's even more radical enforcement agenda would be \$1.1 Trillion including 1) the costs of mass deportations, 2) the costs of presumably impenetrable walls, and 3) the build up and maintenance of a hugely expanded immigration control and enforcement apparatus.¹⁵

1) Deporting the eleven million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. is a massive task, the equivalent of capturing, detaining, processing and expelling the combined populations of New York, San Francisco, Boston, Seattle and Detroit. The center-right American Action Forum estimates that the price tag for mass deportation would be as much as \$300 billion dollars. 3

2) Building a complete wall along the 1,954 mile border with Mexico would also be a major undertaking---the completed wall would be more than twice as long as the 858 mile "iron curtain" that separated East and West Germany during the Cold War. Given that 670 miles are already walled, a Trump White House would presumably need to build an additional 1,284 miles of walls, which at \$16 million per mile would cost \$20 billion in total. Fulfilling GOP candidate Scott Walkers' call for a similar border wall with Canada would add an additional 3,987 miles of walls, with another 1,538 miles for the Alaska-Canada border---costing an additional \$88.4 billion.

3) Finally Trump has called for significantly increasing the \$41 billion annual budget of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), specifically tripling the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. Conservatively estimating a \$60 billion annually increase in the DHS budget adds an additional \$600 billion in spending over the next ten years.

¹⁵ Hinojosa, Raul. "Six HUGE Numbers Which Should Automatically Disqualify Trump from Being President". September 2015. Accessed August 2016
http://www.naid.ucla.edu/uploads/4/2/1/9/4219226/hinojosa_six_trump_numbers_final2.pdf

Appendix

Major Immigration Enforcement Laws Enacted 1986 – 2015

Year	Immigration Enforcement Law	Brief Description ¹	Estimate Expenditure ²
1986	IRCA: Immigration Reform and Control Act	Increase in 50% the border patrol staffing as well as impose sanctions to employers who knowingly hire or recruit unauthorized immigrants	
1988	1: Anti-Drug Abuse Act	“Aggravated felony” is included as a new but limited ground for deportation.	
1990	2: 1990 Immigration Act	Among other things, expands the scope of aggravated felony to include nonpolitical crimes of violence for which a prison sentence of at least five years was imposed.	
1994	3: Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act	Penalties for aliens smuggling and reentry after deportation were enhanced, as well as gives the US Attorney the discretion to bypass deportation proceedings for certain alien aggravated felons.	
1996	4: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act	Establish the “Expedited Removal” procedure for arriving noncitizens who border officials suspect of lacking proper entry documents or being engaged in fraud.	
1996	5: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act	Among other things, this law introduces new border control	

		measures, reduces government benefits available to migrants, mandates an entry-system to monitor both arrivals and departures of immigrants, as well as reinforces the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act” actions.	
2001	6: USA Patriot Act	Exclude aliens from entering the United States through the broaden of terrorism grounds and increases monitoring of foreign students.	\$104 millions in FY 2002, \$50 million over the period 2003-2006 and \$20 millions yearly after 2006
2002	7: Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act	Relevant information to alien admissibility and removability is shared by the development of an interoperable electronic data system	Is estimated that the net effect is less than \$500,000 annually
2002	8: Homeland Security Act	All the functions of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are transferred to Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	\$4.5 billion over the period 2003-2007. There were projected that direct spending from federal retirements funds increased around \$1 million in 2003 and by \$5 million over the 2003-2012 period
2005	9: REAL ID Act	Includes measures to improve border infrastructure, and requires states to verify an applicant’s legal status before issuing a driver’s license or personal identification	\$120 million over the period 2006-2010 to the state, local and some tribal governments
2006	10: Secure Fence Act	Mandates the construction of more than 700 miles of	Estimated in \$4.1 billion

		doubled-reinforced fence to be built along the border with Mexico	
2010	11: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act	Makes appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for FY 2010 for the Offices of the Secretary of Homeland Security the Under Secretary for Management, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Information Officer, the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, and the Inspector General and for intelligence analysis and operations coordination activities.	
2010	12: Making emergency supplemental appropriations for border security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes	For additional amount for salaries and expenses, border security fencing, infrastructure, and technology for the US CPB and ICE.	
2012	13: Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act	Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to: Establish BEST units, Direct the assignment of federal personnel to the program, Take other actions to assist federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to participate	
2015	14: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act	Provides FY2015 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the	

		Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Secret Service, and other DHS programs.	
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1. Information has been obtained from: "Major Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present"; Pew Research Center, web: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790>
2. Information has been obtained from Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Cost Estimates web: <https://www.cbo.gov/cost-estimates>

Accompanied and Unaccompanied Alien Children in US and Mexico Apprehensions 2003-2015

Year	"Unaccompanied Alien Children" US	"Accompanied Alien Children" US	Total Juvenile apprehensions US	Unaccompanied Alien Children MX	Accompanied Alien Children MX
2003	4,792	81,805			
2004	6,200	103,294			
2005	7,787	106,776			
2006	7,746	94,206			
2007			77,778		
2008	7,500	52,078			
2009	20,000	20,461			
2010	18,500	12,791		1,535	2,186
2011	16,067	7,022		1,456	2,442
2012	24,481	6,548		2,554	3,200
2013	38,833	8,564		3,793	5,437
2014	68,631	38,892		11,808	10,711
2015	40,035	22,132		15,330	17,363

Source: statistics from Insituto Nacional de Migraciones (INM) of Mexico, Congressional Research Service and CBP FY profiles

Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered by Fiscal Year: Fiscal Years 2009-2015, FY 2016 through July

Years	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico
2009	1,221	1,115	968	16,114
2010	1,910	1,517	1,017	13,724
2011	1,394	1,565	974	11,768
2012	3,314	3,835	2,997	13,974
2013	5,990	8,068	6,747	17,240
2014	16,404	17,057	18,244	15,634
2015	9,389	13,589	5,409	11,012
2016	14,343	15,243	8,128	9,853