North American Integration Policy Formation
From the Grassroots Up:
Transnational Implications of Latino, Labor, and Environmental
NGO Strategies

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(1) Introduction

The politics of international economic policy formation in the United
States, the world’s largest trader and investor, has become increasingly divisive in
the 1990’s. Throughout the decade, U.S.-Mexico economic relations have
become the primary metaphor for the discussion of the global costs and benefits
of trade and investment growth, along with the increasingly pivotal role of three
related issue areas that traditionally were not part of trade policy debates:
environmental sustainability, labor rights and standards, and community
economic adjustment and development. When top Mexican government officials
came to Washington in January 1990 for a hastily arranged meeting to tell the
Bush Administration that Mexico would take the U.S. up on an often rhetorically
made offer to negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
prospect that these three issues were at all important was completely absent.1 By
the time of the final vote on NAFTA by the U.S. House of Representatives in
November 1993, an unusually effective strategic coalition of Latino and
environmental groups had succeeded in forcing the establishment of new set of
transnational institutions as a part of the “NAFTA Plus” legislative package,
becoming the determining factor in the slim congressional majority for the
agreement.2 Four years later, however, the failure of Clinton Administration to
have built a consensus on addressing the impacts of NAFTA, the efficacy of the
NAFTA institutions, and the continuing role of environmental, labor and
community economic adjustment issues in future trade agreements, resulting in
the withdrawal of support by Latino and environmental groups from the fragile
“NAFTA Plus” coalition, thus significantly wounding the prospects for President

1 See Hinojosa-Ojeda, (1991). As we shall explore below, traditional theoretical frameworks in the fields
of economics and political science were equally unprepared to predict, explain or guide the new pattern of
negotiations that would ensue.
Clinton's request for "fast-track" negotiating authority. This lack of consensus within the U.S. and the North American context has thus stalemated the prospects for further global trade and investment liberalization agreements or progress on their incorporation of environmental, labor and community development issues.

At this impasse, the time is ripe for theoretical and strategic reflection: How was it that these non-traditional issues were able to rise to the top of an agenda that was historically controlled by a select few set of state and economic interests? How unique were the conditions that generated the ability of a new set of actors, particular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the environmental and U.S. Latino communities, to play such a strategic role vis a vis the more traditional state, business and labor actors in the North American context? How important have the new NAFTA related institutions been, and could potentially be, as social and political avenues for addressing the inequalities that gave rise to the new set of environmental, labor and development issues in North America? What have we learned about the needed capacity for crafting, mobilizing and implementing new transnational alliances and institutions that can successfully advance alternative approaches to the issues of transnational uneven development?

I will argue four basic points in response to these questions:

(1) The NAFTA and side agreements experience represents a significant milestone in the emergence of new societal actors into the traditionally closed arena of international economic policy making long dominated by a limited set of state agencies and economic interests, with potentially important global implications. The process of globalization over the past two decades has created a new politically contested arena where new major issues will remain unresolved for quite some time since neither governing states nor societal actors are prepared to propose new as yet politically sustainable transnational policy agendas. This new political space is both a unique opportunity for "clear field" running in proposing new progressive approaches as well as an opening for strong reactionary tendencies froth with national chauvinist and racist currents.

The successful development of an alternative grassroots approach in the North American context was ironically due to the highly uneven pattern of development and rapid integration led by primarily by societal actors (multinational capital and immigrant labor) combined with a substantially uneven access of political rights by poorer communities in the US, Mexico and Canada and limited avenues of political redress concerning the unequal consequences of the historical pattern of transnational integration. While the actual impact of North American integration is highly asymmetrical (much less significant for the US than for Mexico or Canada), a variety of U.S. societal actors were nevertheless able to take advantage of the process of negotiating a free trade agreement initiated by governing states primarily for geo-political purposes, and were able to
highlight long neglected consequence of global integration and uneven development.

(2) Within this new context, the Latino community played a uniquely crucial role in providing a transnational perspective and vision of a third way specific to North America that recognized the inevitability and potential benefits of integration, while focusing attention on addressing the costs of integration which lower wage Mexicans on both sides of the border had been experiencing long before NAFTA became a hot political issue. This transnational Latino perspective and emerging identity as a political actor was rooted in a long and harsh lived experience with the process of economic integration, particularly during most of the post war era when most groups in the US were not interested in Mexico. This alternative perspective as adopted in light of, and despite evidence that, the Latino community would be by far more disproportionately impacted by NAFTA than any other US constituency.3

The emerging difference and complementary of strategies among the variety of Latino, environmental and other activists forced the national states to reopen the NAFTA agenda and eventually enter into globally unprecedented agreements which created equally unprecedented publicly oriented transnational institutions for addressing labor, environmental, and community development issues. Other more staunchly anti-NAFTA mental and labor groups were effectively able to use NAFTA as a metaphor for discussing the negative impacts of globalization, and while falling short of developing concrete popularly based legislative proposals, were nevertheless crucial in establishing a strategic counterweight which allowed the NAFTA-Plus coalition to provide a politically credible alternative.4

(3) The uneven construction and performance of the NAFTA related institutions can be traced back to the differences in strategic interactions between different societal actors and national states, particularly the underdeveloped capacity of groups to have already constituted a transnational network with well thought out and coordinated visions of short and medium term steps necessary for North America strategic cooperation. It is argued that the fragileness of the original coalition which forced the new agenda items on the states, led to the emboldening of conservative opponents of the “NAFTA Plus” consensus and to the withdrawal of the tentative support by North American states to aggressively follow through on these consensus approaches and the institutions that they represented. It was this failure of the state actors to carry through on forceful implementation of the side agreements and their expansion under “fast track” which led Latino and environmental groups who supported the “NAFTA Plus”

4 Audley (1997) credits this dual “good cop/bad cop” approach as providing the source of political “preemptive leverage” to “modify the political agenda for trade policy negotiations to included environmental issues.” (p. 3-4). Audley also points out how for environmental groups “the Mexico-US border served as the metaphor for the potential problems with unregulated economic integration” (p. 50).
consensus to withdraw crucial support which has contributed to the current stalemate.

(4) The new political arena of international economic policy formation is still very fluid and is being reshaped by on-going strategic interactions between national societal actors, governing states, international institutions, and transnational activist networks in ways that are setting new norms, principles, and terms of the coming debate on future trade agreements.

In the coming future debate on "fast-track" and US international economic policy, which will undoubtedly be highly focused once again on the US-Mexico issues, it will be another opportunity to go beyond a simple rejectionist stand and be in a position to propose viable transnational policy alternatives. The future evolution of the North American pattern of integration and development, as well as the scope and efficacy of agreements and institutions, will depend on the evolution of transnational societal networking and coordinated action, including strategic choices that will influence the agenda of states and traditional economic actors.

Within this context, the key issue will be the capacity of groups to carry forth activity in the following areas:

- A broad popular vision of socially just and environmentally sustainable patterns of economic development with on-going integration through trade, investments, and migration.

- A coordinated strategy to move governments and legislatures to build on and expand on the elements of "NAFTA-Plus" approach for next round of fast-track and future trade agreements.

- Immediate campaigns to move the NAFTA institutions to test their limits of activity through continuous exemplary uses and exhaustion of the potential of these institutions to leverage on-going labor, environmental, and community development organizing.

- Coordinated program of transnational network building capacity among a wide range of groups with potentially complementary strategic objectives in North America, the Western Hemisphere, as well as other areas of the globe.

These alternative should be based on theorizing of the type of institutions for democratically allocating and implementing long term resource mobilization to address environmental sustainability and economic developmental inequalities.

Principles for expanding access and enforcing basic human, labor and political rights constitutionally purported to be available to all members
Generated a far-reaching new dynamic of issues and actors, which eventually led to new types of trade agreements and international institutions.

NAFTA Environmental and labor institutions a case study of the interaction between states and new social actors in a much more complex process than had even been before.

Latino, labor and environmental social movements.

(EU, it could be said, was driven by state centered realist politics; this was driven by social centered concerns)

But this same non-state centered process of institutional development

This paper will proceed by first critically developing a framework of analysis of North American economic integration that has given rise to the new political arena for actors and agendas that set the stage for the NAFTA and side agreement negotiations. Second, the paper traces the strategic interactions between the new societal actors and governments, which led to the formation of agreements and institutions. Third is an evaluation of the side agreements and institutions and discuss the recent failure of fast track. Fourth, the paper offers some conclusions and strategic recommendations for further research, social mobilization, and policy actions that could lead to strategic movement towards a more sustainable and democratic pattern of North American integration and development.

(2) Theorizing the Arena for Strategic Action

The emergence of a powerful group of societal actors in trade negotiations in the North American context was a phenomena that was not predicted by state and economic interests traditionally in control of forming international economic policy, nor was it predicted or easily explained by traditional theories in the fields of economics and political science.

Most policy makers and economic and political theorist have held that the problematic of international economic policy involved interactions between state actors (the so-called realist framework of analysis), with some also allowing for the important role of dominate economic actors and institutions within, and sometimes across, national societies (the so-called liberal or institutionalist
framework. More recently, the theoretical approach of “two-level games” has attempted to go beyond purely realist or liberal interpretations cast in terms of either domestic causes and international effects (“second image”) or of international causes and domestic effects (“second-image-reversed”) and “aim instead for ‘general equilibrium’ theories which account simultaneously for the interactions of domestic and international factors.” The conceptualization of this approach can be summarized in Figure 1, displaying the rather mechanistic and limited operation of the original metaphorical formulation. Finally, a new wave of so-called “constructivist” theorizing has emphasized how ideas and identities are created, and “the capacity of new discourses to shape how political actors define themselves and their interest and thus modify their behavior.” Within this current, international networks of activists are beginning to be recognized by some as increasingly important mechanisms for the development new policy ideas and the effectiveness of international institutions.

Different theorists have tried to interpret the NAFTA negotiations within these various frameworks, each resulting in at best a partial view of the entire dynamics. One interpretation places itself “in accord with realists like Stephan Krasner (1983) and Geoffrey Garnet (1992)” and “argues that trade-environmental agenda is driven by wealthy states with relatively stringent environmental regulations.” The adoption of environmental provision of the NAFTA is attributed to a “spillover” tendency whereby “as integration deepens through liberalization among members of a trade organization, the richer, greener countries interest in the development of environment-friendly rules also increases.” Thus the incorporation of environmental trade agenda NAFTA is seen as more advanced than in the WTO, but less so compared to the EU due to the

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relative weight of “powerful green states that demand an increasingly environmental-friendly web of trade-environment rules.”

While this approach has the virtue of focusing attention on the strategic motivation of state actors, the problem with this analysis in the case of NAFTA is that the agreement was negotiated in 1992 with essentially the same provisions as what became the WTO, despite the US and Canada’s much stronger position with respect to Mexico during that time. It was only after the unexpected emergence of new political forces in opposition to the original NAFTA text signed in September of 1992, that the governments were forced to launch new negotiations on additional side agreements. It is precisely this emergence and formation of a new political dynamic arena with new societal actors which set the basis for a much greener NAFTA, that needs to be explained rather than merely attributed to a secular or functionalist tendency for spillovers from continuous integration.

More traditional realist interpretations are nevertheless useful in explaining the origins of the US-Mexico negotiations. North American state actors did have clear interests in initiating negotiations and the motivations appear to have originally focused on specific geo-political and Mexican political regime stability concerns, with only much vaguer economic ideas and goals serving as secondary and complicating motivations. While the advanced states did pursue a stronger environmental and labor agenda, they did so in a janus faced manner, pushing an inter-state agenda only as far as necessary to deal efficacious with domestic pressures of their own countries, and in the case of the Mexican government, societal actors of the other countries as well.

Most theories of US trade politics have historically been developed within a liberal framework, stressing the importance of the domestic constraints on state actors. The classic analysis of the US problematic published in 1935 focused on the now famous Smoot-Hawley bill and stressed that individual sectoral or regional interest would always have a tendency to overwhelm the collective or general interests. Trade politics would be dominated by the conflict between many special interest with localized power to protect their particular sector that could potentially overwhelm an overall interest which is diffuse. Since the depression of the 1930’s, theorizing and political practice have focused on how to

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14 For example, the NAFTA provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures are very similar to the so-called “Dunkel-text” that became the basis of the final Uruguay Round text.
15 Hinojosa (1991) interviewed White House staff that indicated the original motivation came from the National Security Council’s concerns about the Mexican left’s electoral prospects in the absence of a substantial Mexican debt reduction agreement. Grayson (1995) and Destler (1995) also confirm that the USTR was actually initially against a US-Mexico negotiation because it would detract attention from larger global concerns such as the Uruguay Round.
limit the aggregated influences of special interests in favor of more autonomous ability of the state to negotiate in the “national interest.”

Destler (1995) and Grayson (1995) both see the NAFTA side agreements as representing a dual failure by a “less protected Congress facing unprecedented trade-political pressures generated mainly by unprecedented trade deficits”\textsuperscript{17} and by an Executive under “Clinton [who] ceded the field to the NAFTA critics.”\textsuperscript{18} Destler shows, however, that traditional Congressional tight control over the trade agenda in places like the House Ways and Means Committee began to erode in the mid 1980s, even before the FTA with Canada and the GATT round were launched. Yet as many analysts have pointed out, it was only with NAFTA and especially the side agreements that “the relationship between trade liberalization and consumer and environmental protection became visible for the first time in the United States.”\textsuperscript{19} This liberal formulation is thus also not sufficient to explain why it took the US-Mexico context and NAFTA to produce a large-scale emergence of new issues and actors, despite the relatively smaller impact on the US economy compared to Canada and GATT.

The new reality of anti-trade politics is also now more complex, especially with respect to Latino and environmentalists organizations whose role in the negotiations cannot be merely attributed to, or labeled as, protectionism as in the traditional liberal formulation. They did not oppose trade in sectorally specific areas or even trade in general, but rather they sought to make the trade regime adopt to the more general and collective concerns of an adequate adjustment process, enforcement of labor rights, and sustainable development.

Understanding the role of the Clinton Administration in the NAFTA side agreements also requires going beyond traditional liberal formulations of state-society interactions in the making of trade policy and beyond what might appear to be a two level game formulation of inter-state negotiations with national domestic actors. Rather than an analysis of Clinton “ceding the field to the critics,” the actions of the administration have to be seen in an obviously more complex bargaining with a series of international and global players, as well as with a series of domestic constituencies which were now developing transnational linkages and alliances with their own alternative transnational policy agendas.

Furthermore, not only have domestic societal actors begun to develop linked strategies across national boundaries with other societal actors, national states have also attempted to develop strategies and even linkages with societal actors in other countries. Finally, the experience of the Clinton Administration and the NAFTA side agreements must also include the co-lateral and resulting emergence of both transnational societal networks and organizations, as well as new transnational multi-state institutions, both of which open up new arenas for

\textsuperscript{17} Destler (1995), p. 66.
\textsuperscript{19} Vogel (1998).
transnational political contestation as well as new types of transnational strategic actors.

Thus the traditional two level game framework must be reformulated to include not only a more complex “multi-level” structure of strategic interactions, but also an understanding of the dynamic process of the shaping of this new “multi-level” transnational political arena. Diagram (2) represents this more complex structure of “multi-level” interactions, including interactions (1) between states; (2) states and national societal actors; (3) national to national societal actors; (4) international institutions to states, national societal actors, and transnational societal actors; and (5) transnational societal actors to international institutions, states, and national societal actors.

In addition to this structure of interactions, however, what is perhaps more needed from a theoretical and political perspective to conceptualize the way that these incipient new patterns of strategic interactions have shaped and will be shaping the future contours of relative power relations and possible alternative options in the emerging transnational political arena.

In this very fluid period in the initial formation of this new political arena, the stakes are very high indeed as new path dependencies are created. Each outcome of these emerging patterns of strategic interaction (either as “wars of maneuvers” or “wars of positions”) also help shape the identities and capacities of national organizations and transnational networks, as well as the viability of concrete movements that effect people lives and the type of alternative metaphors adopted in the popular debates.

(3) The Shaping of the Transnational Political Arena

The history of approximately the last 20 years of US Mexico relations reveals an iterative process of strategic interactions between these various actors and the shaping of the transnational political arena and the pattern of uneven economic integration between the two countries. As has happened in previous phases of North American US-Mexico relations, the current dynamics are being constrained by the (a) changing pattern of integration process in the division of production, distribution and environmental linkages, and (b) the continuously contested patterns of state-society relations within and across countries. As has also happened in previous historical phases of the bi-national relation, the characteristics of the US-Mexico problematic are often highly exaggerated both in terms of their importance to the US as well as exaggerated in the way the outcomes of the particular resolution of US-Mexico relations end up having global consequences for US polices with developing countries that outstrip the power of the original metaphor.20

While NAFTA was unprecedented in many regards

NAFTA unprecedented. within North American uneven development particularities, more specifically visible effects (if still small)

The emergence of this new political arena in the North American and NAFTA context can thus be seen as due to the changing interaction between (a) the highly uneven pattern of development and rapid integration led by primarily by societal actors (businesses and migrants) combined with (b) a substantially uneven distribution of political rights in both the US, Mexico and Canada and limited avenues of political redress concerning the unequal consequences of the historical pattern of transnational integration. It is within this changing pattern of transnational and national structures that new forms of strategic action are being created.

The historical context of the new North American political arena has to be seen as emerging from the historical uneven development has to be seen in the context of: 21

- The shift from previous post-WW II pattern of nationally based patterns of economic growth integration with limited actors involved in the dominate patterns of state/society relations;

- To new pattern of dramatically accelerated transnational integration with increased uneven development with a break down of old state society relations and new movement towards democratization of previously excluded players.

The previous postwar pattern of North American integration, dominated by “Fordist” patterns of accumulation and distribution in the U.S. and “import substituting industrialization” (ISI) in Mexico, production in both countries was primarily for domestic consumption with trade and direct foreign investment limited to final goods.

While some actors during this period did have extensive transnational involvement (internationalized corporation and immigrant workers), most domestic societal actors were primarily preoccupied with their own national domestic political and economic pacts. Northern (US and Canada) actors that did have direct relations to pattern of transnational accumulation (labor unions of US multinational corporations [MNCs]) basically ignored and benefited from the asymmetry of the pattern, as long as their basic domestic interests were being met.\textsuperscript{22}

Mexican workers, of course, had to deal with US MNCs as adversaries as well as providers of needed employment. Immigrants and Latinos workers had to constantly operate in the context of a transnationally linked and competitive labor market, resolving issues and developing organizing strategies for transnational solidarity and national working class solidarity.\textsuperscript{23} Border worker activists also had to be constantly involved in bridging national and transnational arenas for developing organizing strategies, with very little support from major national societal actors in either country.

(1) **Shifting Political Economy: Uneven restructuring and integration**

The pattern of US-Mexico Integration began to radically change with 1982 debt crisis and Reagan-Thatcher monetarist recession of the early 1980s. The collapse of Mexican ISI model and acceleration of transnational investment led to rapid growth of Mexican export and maquiladora development, as well as rising immigration, falling real wages in Mexico. Employment dislocations and inequality had been rising in the US since the late 1970s, but the “Great U-Turn” accelerated in the 1980’s, hitting Latinos and immigrants the hardest due to their status as last entrants and highest concentration in low wage manufacturing.\textsuperscript{24}

Starting with Mexico’s unilateral liberalization and their joining of the GATT in 1988 (five years before NAFTA), US-Mexico integration and became much more complex saw its greatest period of acceleration, particularly in the investment and trade in intermediate goods.\textsuperscript{25} Yet while North American integration had already been evolving in a particularly uneven pattern of development, both in terms of employment and environmental winners and losers,

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22} There were some isolated attempts of US labor unions to make contact with Mexican unions during the Mexican Revolution (PLM-IWW), the great depression (CIO-CTM) and during the 1960's (UAW-CTM). See Juan Gomez-Quinoñes (1994) and Kevin Middlebrook, (198X). \textsuperscript{23} See Juan Gomez-Quinoñes (1990) and (1994) for a discussion of the CASA-HGT experience and the organizing of the “First International Conference in Defense of Transnational and Undocumented Workers” held in Mexico City in 1980. \textsuperscript{24} Carnoy, M. H. Daley, and R. Hinojosa-Ojeda. "The Changing Economic Position in Latinos in the U.S. Labor Market since 1939." In R. Morales and F. Bonilla (eds.), Latinos in a Changing U.S. Economy. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 1993: 28-54. \textsuperscript{25} Hinojosa Ojeda, et al. (1996). The trade has to be analyzed carefully since its impact on employment can be easily misunderstood.}
the late 1980's growth highlighted the relative underinvestments in environmental infrastructure and employment adjustment in poorer communities, and the proliferation of transnational restructuring driven market failures as growing sources of widening inequalities.

(2) Uneven Integration and Development Generates Unintended Consequences: New Social and Political Actors

The elite driven liberalization and integration generated increasingly unequal pattern of distribution of costs and benefits of economic restructuring, producing in the process the unintended consequence of generating spaces for introduction of new social actors and agendas on behalf of regions and social sectors that have been neglected (in the context of new patterns of unequal development and new social movement formation).

By the time NAFTA was being debated, the real issues for North American uneven development should not have been tariff liberalizations as much as the lack of state-society mechanisms in both the U.S. and Mexico to deal with the new political economy of transnationalization. Yet the predominate metaphor which captured the political and public media imagination in the US was that of Mexico as a low wage, low environmental standard sink that served as an easy explanator for a wide range of increasinly visible social inequalities.

It was in this context that we saw the emergence of a wide range of new actors and new social movement which begin to enter into the political arena with a new sense of social legitimacy. This new form of social and political legitimacy enhanced the incipient formation of new networks and aided the formation of new pattern of national and transnational social capital among Latinos, labor and environmental social movements. In a process similar to how Keck and Sikkink have recently described the formation of advocacy networks in other transnational settings, 26 the existence of a range of unaddresses issues generated a type of vacuum to be filled by social networking entreprenuers who's organizing of forms (like US-Mexico Dialogues) and movements (the 1991 anti-fast track campaign) themselves enhanced the ability to shape the newly reconstituting political arena.

Early on in the pre-NAFTA "fast-track" discussion, however, Latino groups became wary of the "anti-foreign" and "anti-Mexico" tone that was let resonate in many of the arguments about the potential impact of a possible FTA. The acute lived experience of the negative externalities of environment and labor

26 "Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where (1) channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the "boomerang" pattern of influence characteristic of these networks; (2) activists or "political entrepreneurs" believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks.” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), p. 12.

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inequality, which was the organizing milie for most Latino advocacy organizations, produced a affirmation that the issues had to be framed in the context of the transnational labor market and communities network which consisted of Mexican workers as well as immigrants, and Latinos in the US.

While most major Latino groups were not yet on the same page politically in 1991, the various forums and campaigns of the time set the basis for beginning to "identify" with the need for a transnational criteria for binational economic, labor and environmental development, particularly of the most disenfranchised.

(3)-NAFTA I: State Driven Investment and Trade Agenda

The more traditional realist interpretations are actually useful in explaining the origins of the US-Mexico negotiations. North American state actors it seems did have clear interests in initiating negotiations and the motivations appear to have originally focused on specific North American geopolitical and Mexican political regime stability concerns, with only much vaguer economic ideas and goals serving as secondary and complicating motivations.

But while the original impetus for NAFTA reflected more a state-centered logic rather than a specific corporate driven vision, the states nevertheless recruit capital quickly into the project. The mobilization of investors was the states' primary means towards their ends, seeking to driving forward certain trends of transnational investment which helped resolve the short term financial problems which were the primary concerns of both the US and Mexico. Other US geopolitical considerations (moving Europe and Asia on GATT and other binational/regional issues) were then enlisted into the project, but on after much internal debate.

(4)-Mobilization and Expansion of National and Transnational Networking

It was during the relatively closed negotiating of the original NAFTA text in late 1991 and 1992 that transnational civil society networks begin to break onto the US and Mexico national political landscapes quite unexpectedly and with new

27 NCLR ended up supporting it, MALDEF Board was deeply divided, SVRI sat out the debate, and the Latino Congressional Caucus was divided.
28 The original proposal for the NADBANK was presented at both the US-Mexico Dialogues 1991 Labor Meeting in Chicago and the first Latino Consensus Forum in San Antonio in October 1991.
29 Hinojosa (1991) interviewed White House staff that indicate the original motivation came the the National Security Council's worry about Mexican electoral prospects. Grayson (1995) and Destler (1995) confirm that the USTR was initially against a US-Mexico negotiation because it would detract attention from larger global concerns such as the Uruguay Round.
30 Grayson (1995) and Destler (1995) confirm that the USTR was initially against a US-Mexico negotiation because it would detract attention from larger global concerns such as the Uruguay Round.
and developing identities and strategic stances. The "Latino Consensus on NAFTA," for example, was a process that was originated by Southwest Voter Research Institute and was eventually sponsored by over 20 major Latino organizations in the US and scores of Latino electoral officials, represented one of the most comprehensive organizing on virtually any issue area (see Appendix). The Latino Consensus organized 21 regional conferences in the 11 major Latino population states (see Appendix), bring together perhaps the broadest range of national and transnational constituencies (including organizational representatives from labor, environmental, human rights, academia, small business, and economic development groups, as well as all major political parties from the US and Mexico).

As a part of the Latino Consensus, a number of extensive research projects were launched to attempt to estimate the potential employment impacts of NAFTA, the only one of its kind to measure specific regional and labor market impacts by ethnic and gender categories. While the research began to show both before and after the political battle, that NAFTA itself would have a very small effect on the aggregate level and pattern of integration, it would have a proportionately larger negative impacts on Latino workers, particularly immigrant workers.

The Latino Consensus ended up endorsing a common position in December of 1992 which laid out a series of demands in nine issue areas and a number of specific goals to negotiated through additional NAFTA side agreements. In an exercise of unprecedented national Latino electoral influence, these demand would be maintained as the basis for negotiations for over 15 votes on NAFTA with the White House in the Fall of 1993.

Even highly strengthen side agreements would also have very limited effect

Most of the pattern would still be driven by domestic trends.

And most of the politics would also be driven by domestic dynamics.

Interestingly, though, NAFTA would take on disproportionately huge dimensions as a metaphor for what globalization is believed to cause.

3: From NAFTA and Side Agreements Negotiations to NAFTA Vote: 1991-1993

Southwest Latino Consensus 1991-1992

Negotiating with US, Mexico, Clinton Campaign, Labor, Business, Enviros, Mexican social
1993 Negotiating: Clinton Administration, Mexico

The analysis (third way)

The politics

-Constructing the viable coalition: A society centered agenda

The Latino Concensus process

Thus, another very important lesson. That while the impacts might be small, the political ramifications are highly amplified. The Administration decision not to solidify a base of support in the willing social movements, thus also was magnified as an abandonment of the green/blue concerns.

(5)- NAFTA II: States Try to Create and Limit Side Agreements

Within this new political arena, how the states choose to respond this newly emerging networks with strong oppositional stances and/or alternative policy proposals, will be crucial for the political viability of the integration process as well as the potential pattern of uneven development and the evolution in state/society relations. While the US and Canadian Governments (advanced states) did pursue a stronger environmental and labor agenda, they did so in a Janus faced manner, pushing an inter-state agenda only as far as necessary to deal efficacious with domestic pressures of their own countries, and in the case of the Mexican government, societal actors of the other countries as well.

Thus there did develop a type of functionalist "spillover" from trade and investment liberalization agendas, not in the neo-functionalist sense, but rather as unintended consequence. It is not that liberal institutions were open to these efforts. They were thrust upon the agenda. Nor did the Clinton Campaign or Administration see the NAFTA issues as a political priority or even an opportunity. They too were forced to deal with it.

The NAFTA side agreements negotiations were actually a series of multi-country linked multi-level games, that mobilized, limited, and institutionalized certain patterns of corporate, societal, state and transnational organizational practices and possibilities. The Clinton Administration sought to build a political coalition that balanced on the one hand, incorporating demand of segments of civil society on labor and environmental issues that could win votes, and on the other, limiting access of civil society as much as possible not to interfere with private investors which might loose them corporate support and republican votes.
The Clinton Administration, pursued a strategy of domestic state-society interactions during the NAFTA side agreement negotiations which tried to limit the role of civil society interventions as much as possible while nevertheless agreeing to the principles of “transparency and public participation.” How “transparency and public participation” were define, however, would be different in each of the labor, environmental and community development sides agreements. These differential institutional constructions were due to the type of political calculations and coalitions within each issue area, not any unified vision of needed institutions or their potential economic impact.

6) The Latino Accountability Exercise and Current Stalemate

In the end, the multi-level strategy followed by the Clinton Administration allowed it to achieve their short term political objective: the passage of NAFTA. Yet ironically the success of the state attempts to limit civil society based institutions led to a weakness of the sustainability of the NAFTA consensus.

Fasttrack Vote 1997

-Ironic Harvest: The states take over negotiation
-The short coming of the side agreements
-The final Deal

What was Created: What has been Accomplished/Evaluation

The Latino Accountability Exercise

Switching in the Fast-Track 97 debate

Evolution of NAFTA side agreements was an unprecedented activity in three each of its phases:
(1) New arenas which have a more highly linked series of corporate, and civil society states and trans-state apparatuses. Unprecedented role for civil society (even more than in Europe).

(2) Evaluation of what has been accomplished via side agreements

Generated a far-reaching new dynamic of issues and actors, which eventually led to new types of trade agreements and international institutions.

NAFTA Environmental and labor institutions a case study of the interaction between states and new social actors in a much more complex process than had even been before.

Latino, labor and environmental social movements.

(EU, it could be said, was driven by state centered realist politics; this was driven by social centered concerns)

But this same non-state centered process of institutional development

Unprecedented as it was,

The process was so limited, such that unable to have shifted pattern of uneven development or even maintain collation and new pattern of equitable development.

Yet still better than if nothing had happened. New pattern of integration is creating secular changes within and between states and societies, as well as new winners.

(6) **Current Stalemate, Future Challenges**

The new political arena of international economic policy formation is still very fluid and is being reshaped by on-going strategic interactions between national societal actors, governing states, international institutions, and transnational activist networks in ways that are setting new norms, principles, and terms of the coming debate on future trade agreements.

In the coming future debate on “fast-track” and US international economic policy, which will undoubtedly be highly focused once again on the US-Mexico issues, it will be another opportunity to go beyond a simple rejectionist stand and be in a position to propose viable transnational policy alternatives. The future
evolution of the North American pattern of integration and development, as well as the scope and efficacy of agreements and institutions, will depend on the evolution of transnational societal networking and coordinated action, including strategic choices that will influence the agenda of states and traditional economic actors.

Within this context, the key issue will be the capacity of groups to carry forth activity in the following areas:

- A broad popular vision of socially just and environmentally sustainable patterns of economic development with on-going integration through trade, investments, and migration.

- A coordinated strategy to move governments and legislatures to build on and expand on the elements of “NAFTA-Plus” approach for next round of fast-track and future trade agreements.

- Immediate campaigns to move the NAFTA institutions to test their limits of activity through continuous exemplary uses and exahution of the potential of these institutions to leverage on-going labor, evenironemntal, and community developement organizing.

- Coordinated program of transnational network building capacity among a wide range of groups with potentially complementary strategic objectives in North America, the Western Hemisphere, as well as other areas of the globe.

These alternative should be based on theorizing of the type of institutions for democratically allocating and implementing long term resource mobilization to address environmentl sustainability and economic developmental inequalities.

Principles for expanding access and enforcing basic human, labor and political rights constitutionally purported to be available to all members

Short term

Transnational capacity building via concrete actions

Agenda for NAFTA institutions

Long term

Propositional vision formation
Migration, rights

Monetary fiscal
(3) Historical Dynamics and Strategic Identity Development

The context of uneven development

- The shift from previous pattern of nationally based integration (with limited actors in state/society relations
- To new pattern if increase integration with uneven development, break down of old state society relations, new movement towards democratization of previously excluded players.

The actors, old and new

Latinos, Labor, Greens, Business, Mexico, Washington

Mobilizations

Chronology

1: Antecedents of LATINO transnational organizing perspectives (Juan Gomez Quinones)

AFL-CIO ban on non-CTM Contact in Post-War (Toledano-CIO contacts)
UAW

Casa-HGT and other groups had been developing bi-national solidarity vision since 1960's, as well as class based multi-racial alliance building strategies in the 1970s and 1980s.

First attempt at bi-national labor conference in 1980 around immigration issues.


1989 Salinas trip to US
1990 Serra trip to US

Vogel: Pre-NAFTA First time ever-environmental issues appear
Appendix: The Latino Consensus Sponsorship (Partial List)

Washington D.C.
National Council of La Raza
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement
National Puerto Rican Coalition
Cuban American Committee Research and Education Fund

Illinois
Latino Institute
Midwest-Northeast Voter Registration Education Project

Florida
Cuban American Coalition

Colorado
Mexican American State Legislators Policy Institute

Michigan
Julian Samora Research Institute
Mexico-United States Consortium for Academic Cooperation

Arizona
Arizona Hispanic Community Forum

New York
National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights

Texas
Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project
Southwest Voter Research Institute
Texas Industrial Areas Foundation
Texas Association of Mexican American Chambers of Commerce
League of United Latin American Citizens

California
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
Organization for Legal Advancement of LA Raza
La Opinion Newspaper
Latino Consensus Conference Sites (Fall 1991 to Summer 1992)

Washington D.C.

Illinois
    Chicago

New York
    NYC
    Albany

New Jersey

New Mexico
    Santa Fe
    Albuquerque

Florida
    Miami

Colorado
    Denver

Michigan
    Ann Arbor

Arizona
    Tuscon
    Phoenix

Texas
    Austin
    San Antonio
    Houston
    Rio Grande Valley

California
    San Francisco
    Oxnard
    Los Angeles
    Sacramento
    San Joaquin Valley
    San Diego
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Garza


Grigsby


Geoffrey Garnet (1992),


Huntington


Kanter


Stephan Krasner (1983)


Porter


Soja


Walt (1998)


Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California.


